We propose a theoretical framework to study the determinants of ethnic and religious identity along two distinct motivational processes: cultural distinction and cultural conformity. Under cultural conformity, ethnic identity is reduced by neighborhood integration, which weakens group loyalties and prejudices. On the contrary, under cultural distinction, ethnic minorities are more motivated in retaining their own distinctive cultural heritage the more integrated are the neighborhoods where they reside and work. Data on ethnic preferences and attitudes provided by the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in the UK enables us to test the relative significance of these two identity processes. We find evidence consistent with intense ethnic and religious identity mostly formed as a cultural distinction mechanism. Consistently, we document that ethnic identities are more intense in mixed than in segregated neighborhoods.
Introduction
In the last decades, immigration into western countries has become an important facet of globalization. This phenomenon has induced renewed interest on the rise of ethnic diversity in the host countries. 2 While cultural diversity is generally seen a desirable societal trait, the persistence of ethnic identities on the part of minorities is often perceived by natives as a threat or as a source of potential problems (see Alba, 1990 Alba, , 2005 . This is well illustrated, for instance, by the recent passionate debates all over Europe about the building of mosques or the public display of religious attire on the part of Muslim women. As Robert D. Putnam puts it in his John Skytte Price Lecture (2007) , "the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced countries is one of the most important challenges facing modern societies, and at the same time one of our most significant opportunities".
Two opposing views characterize the conceptual analysis of identity formation mechanisms in the social sciences. 3 The first view is characterized by the postulation that ethnic identity is reduced by assimilation and by the blurring of groups' boundaries. Assimilation theories, in political science and sociology (Gordon, 1964; Moghaddam and Solliday 1991) and contact theory in social psychology (Allport, 1954) are the prominent manifestations of this line of thought. Underlying these theories is the principle that group identity is driven by a preference for inclusiveness and cultural conformity. 4 The alternative view represents instead ethnic minorities as motivated in keeping their own distinctive cultural heritage, in identifying themselves with an ethnic/social group to generate a sense of positive distinctiveness from the cultural predispositions of the majority (Abrams and Hogg, 1988; Turner 1982) . These ideas compose the core of theories of multiculturalism (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; Taylor and Lambert, 1996) , and conflict (Bobo, 1999) . 5 The fundamental principle of these theories is that group identity formation is driven by a preference for cultural distinction.
In this paper we aim at providing an empirical test of whether it is cultural conformity or cultural distinction that stands as the most prominent underlying motivational structure driving ethnic identity formation. Indeed, cultural conformity and cultural distinction provide distinct empirical implications on the way neighborhood segregation interacts with the process of ethnic integration. When cultural 1 Thanks to Andrew Clark for Morissey's quote. 2 Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provide a general discussion of the economic effects of increased ethnic diversity. 3 The study of ethnic identity formation has a long theoretical and empirical tradition in social sciences with Cross (1991), Phinney (1990) , Ferdman (1995) in developmental psychology, Stryker (1980) in symbolic interactionist sociology, Tajfel (1981) , Tajfel and Turner (1979) , Turner et al. (1987) in social psychology, and Brewer (2001) in political psychology. 4 See Bernheim (1994) for a formal economic analysis of conformity. 5 At a broader level, this view is also related to the social identity theory in social psychology (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1982) .
conformity is the main motivational process of identity formation, we expect neighborhood segregation to act as a complement to ethnic assimilation. On the contrary, when cultural distinction is at work, neighborhood segregation might substitute for ethnic assimilation. 6 Nonetheless, identifying empirically cultural conformity and cultural distinction by studying the interaction between neighborhood segregation and ethnic integration is complicated for two reasons. First of all, cultural conformity and cultural distinction are specific dimensions of individuals' preferences whose manifestation in their choices is mediated by the characteristics of the choice environment itself. For instance, while cultural distinction reduces the "demand" for homogamous marriages (an indicator of identity) in segregated neighborhoods, this effect is confounded by a "supply" effect: homogamous marriages are facilitated, simply as a consequence of random matching, in segregated neighborhoods where a single ethnic group is relatively dominant. Secondly, the distribution of the population by ethnic trait across neighborhoods is not exogenous. Individuals choose where to live depending also on their preferences for ethnic identity.
Without data on independent shifts of the "demand" and the "supply" of marriage and identity, we need to resort to a simple choice model of identity formation and marriage along the homogamy/heterogamy dimension. This allows us to distinguish between individuals' preferences for ethnic identity under relatively weak assumptions, for given distribution of the population across neighborhoods. Without a natural experiment, the endogeneity of the neighborhood distribution of the population by ethnic trait is, in principle, an even harder problem to deal with. Also, in this case, we resort to modeling: any reasonable endogenous neighborhood location choice problem in our context would in fact generate the implication that individuals with stronger preferences for ethnic identity locate in more ethnically segregated neighborhoods. As a consequence, any evidence showing that ethnic integration is not weakened, the more segregated the neighborhoods are, can be interpreted as evidence for cultural distinction. In conclusion, we cannot answer causal questions like "how much more/less identity would an individual with given characteristics form when moved from a neighborhood A to a neighborhood B?" Nonetheless, under our modeling assumptions, we can evaluate the relative likelihood of the data with respect to cultural distinction vs. cultural conformity.
Our empirical analysis exploits a unique UK dataset, the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM), which over-samples ethnic minority groups and provide a wealth of information about different dimensions of identity and aspects of individual's ethnic preferences. In addition, the data can be merged with the Census, so that it is possible to obtain a detailed picture of each individual's residential neighborhood at a very high level of spatial disaggregation. We proceed then in steps, according to the outline suggested above, from a non-structural analysis of the data, adding structure at each step, e.g., adding first functional form assumptions, which distinguish between "demand" and 6 In economics, the distinction between cultural conformity and cultural distinction is also related to the notion of cultural complementarity and cultural substitutability between socialization mechanisms. This has been defined formally by Bisin and Verdier (2000) . Indeed, in Bisin and Verdier (2000) , when family and role models tend to be substitutes in the process of socialization, families with a relatively minoritarian cultural trait have larger incentives to spend resources socializing their children to their trait in order to ensure its persistence. Conversely, under cultural complementarity, the more minoritarian is a family's cultural trait, the lower are the family's incentives to socialize their children to the trait and hence to limit cultural assimilation.
"supply" components of identity formation, and then explicitly modeling assumptions that substitute for exogeneity of the distribution across wards in letting us identify the relative likelihood of the data under distinction and conformity.
We find that the evidence is consistent with ethnic identity to be formed as a cultural distinction mechanism rather than due to cultural conformity. Ethnic identity appears to be formed in social contexts in which the minority ethnic trait is mostly "threatened" either directly by the actions of the majority group (e.g., through explicit acts of rejection or harassment), or indirectly simply by being exposed to the interaction with the majority norm of behavior in mixed neighborhoods.
Such evidence for cultural distinction fits well with several other empirical studies on the link between identity and segregation. Fryer and Torelli (2010) , on data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, find that "acting white" behavior among blacks is more developed in racially mixed schools. 7 Also, Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004) document that, in General Social Survey data, religious socialization across U.S. states is more intense when a religious faith is in minority. 8 Finally, Munshi and Wilson (2011) combine data from the U.S. census and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to identify a negative relationship across counties in the Midwest of the United States between ethnic fractionalization in 1860 and the probability that individuals have professional jobs or migrated out of the county by 2000.
We also address the issue of the alleged specificity of Muslim immigrants with regard to the strength of their identity and their (refusal of) integration; an issue which has recently surged at the center of the political debate in Europe (see, e.g., Gallis, 2005) . To this end we repeat our analysis on the restricted sample of Muslim respondents only. The results are not qualitatively different from the ones found using the whole sample. This evidence suggests that the relationship between ethnic integration effort and ethnic neighborhood composition is not significantly different for Muslims than for the other ethnic minorities. Evidence of slower integration for Muslims, both first and second generation, is, however, apparent in our analysis. 9 
Related literature in economics
Beyond the large sociology and socio-psychology literature on ethnic identity formation, our work is related to a growing economic literature studying the evolution of culture and ethnic identity and its interactions with economic outcomes. Kranton (2000, 2010) consider identity formation as an explicit − more or less conscious − endogenous choice by individuals exposed to a certain social context. Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2006) and Eaton, Eswaran and Oxoby (2009) provide evolution- 7 Anthropologists have also observed that social groups seek to preserve their identity, an activity that accelerates when threats to internal cohesion intensify. Thus, groups may try to reinforce their identity by penalizing members for differentiating themselves from the group. The penalties are likely to increase whenever the threats to group cohesion intensify; for an early analysis of this issues, see Whyte (1943) . 8 Relatedly, Bisin and Verdier (2000) provide many examples of the resilience of ethnic and other cultural traits that can be explained by a similar mechanism, from the case of Orthodox Jews in Brooklyn to the case of aristocrats in France. 9 This is in conformity with other studies in France (Adida et al., 2010) and in the UK (Bisin et al., 2008) .
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ary models discussing the relationship between identity formation and inter-racial interactions. 
Ethnic identity: Data
The Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM) was collected in 1993/94 in the UK by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). It over-samples ethnic minority groups, distinguishing explicitly six of them: Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, African-Asian, Bangladeshi, and Chinese. 10 The survey contains detailed information about the respondents' identification with their own ethnic group (e.g. attitudes towards inter-marriage, importance of religion and other aspects of individual's ethnic preferences) as well as variables aiming at capturing the heterogeneity within the non-white population in terms of individual, demographic, family and socio-economic characteristics (see Modood et al., 1997, for details).
We enrich the analysis of ethnic identification, necessarily a self-reported "subjective" measure, with the study of homogamy marriage along ethnic lines. Homogamy can in fact be considered an "objective" measure of identity, which is conceptually strongly related to our subjective measure.
Finally, to address the main issue of this paper, the identification of cultural distinction versus cultural conformity, we need to study the variation of the respondents' identification with their own ethnic group across different residential neighborhoods as characterized by their ethnic composition. To this end, we use the information provided by the FNSEM data about each individual's residential ward, which is taken from the 1991 Census. 11 
Definition of the variables
The key variables in our analysis are (i) the ethnic composition of the residential neighborhood, q; (ii) the intensity of ethnic identity, ν; and (iii), the probability of homogamous marriage, π. They are described in turn. 10 Black Africans were not included because the bulk of their immigration in the U.K. happened earlier. Furthermore, the survey only covers England and Wales.
11 A UK Census ward contains on average 3,000-4,000 residents.
(i) For each individual i, the percentage of ward inhabitants of the same ethnic group is reported in the data divided in seven classes, q i ≤ 2%, 2% < q i ≤ 5%, 5% < q i ≤ 10%, 10% < q i ≤ 15%, 15% < q i ≤ 25%, 25% < q i ≤ 33%, q i ≥ 33%. In 1991, there were not many wards with a portion of inhabitants of each ethnic group much larger than 33%. 12 In the regression analysis, we use the mean value of each interval and use the top coding q i = 33 for the last class. 13 Figure 1 reports the distribution of respondents over the ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which they live.
[Insert Figure 1 here] (ii) The survey contains a number of questions providing information on different dimensions of identity, in particular, the importance of religion, the attitudes towards inter-marriage, and the relevance of ethnicity in influencing the kind of school people want for their children. 14 It also asks a direct question about ethnic identity. 15 We perform our analysis using separately the answers on each of these questions. Identity, denoted by I, is coded as a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the individual considers as very important the role of religion in her/his life, and 0 otherwise (importance of religion). It takes value 1 if the individual would personally mind if a close relative were to marry a white person, and 0 otherwise (inter-ethnic marriage). It takes value 1 if ethnicity has a very important or at least fairly important influence in choosing the school for a child and 0 otherwise (school ethnic composition). Finally, it takes value 1 if the individual strongly agrees or agrees to the statement "In many ways, I think of myself as [respondent's ethnic group]", and 0 otherwise (ethnic group identification). The variable measuring the intensity of ethnic identity, ν, is then the probability that I = 1, for each aspect of these different measures of identity.
(iii) Homogamy H is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the respondent is married to a person of her/his own ethnic group, and 0 otherwise. The variable π measures the probability that marriage is homogamous. Singles, somewhat consistently with the theoretical analysis of integration in Section 4, are assigned H = 0, that is, they are treated as non-homogamous. 16 An extensive set of control variables is also available. In addition to several individuals' observable 12 According to the Census 1991 data, for example, there are about 25% of the wards with percentages of Bangladeshi higher than 33% but only 5% with portions higher than 40%. 13 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when slightly moving the top coding. characteristics (i.e., education, age, sex, fertility choices, employment status, job qualification, household house ownership, macro-region of residence, time spent in the UK, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is born in the UK or not), the data set also contains variables aiming at capturing the influence of the social environment (family, friends, neighbors) and workplace (language typically spoken in the family, with friends, at work, a dummy capturing instances of discrimination, and one indicating whether the marriage is arranged by the parents, the ward unemployment rate). Precise definitions of all these variables, as well as our sample descriptive statistics, can be found in the Data Appendix (Table A1) . Excluding the individuals with missing or inadequate information on our target variables, we obtain a final sample of 1,559 individuals.
A first analysis of raw data
The relationship observed in the data between ethnic identity and ethnic composition in represented in Figure 2 . In panel (a) ethnic identity is directly measured by I (here importance of religion); while in panel (b) we report we use homogamy, H, as an indirect measure. I seems to vary non-systematically with ethnic composition as measured by q. The view that individuals with stronger ethnic identities tend to live in more segregated neighborhoods is certainly not apparent in the raw data. On the contrary, homogamous marriages are indeed more prevalent in more segregated neighborhood, but the extent to which this is true seems to taper down as q increases: homogamy even declines for q ≥ 33%. 17
It might also be of some interest to present the results of a simple bivariate probit regression, looking at the correlation between ethnic identity and homogamy, and ethnic composition. The regression analysis allows us to account formally for a non-linear relationship and to document the effects of an (increasing) sets of control variables. We use alternative definitions of ethnic identity. Table 1 shows the complete list of estimation results when "importance of religion" is used as a proxy for ethnic identity, whereas Table 2 displays the same results when the three other measures of ethnic identity (ethnic group identification, school ethnic composition, inter-ethnic marriage) are used. 18 
[Insert T ables 1 and 2 here]
We find that there is a positive and significant relationship between ethnic identity and ethnic neighborhood composition q. We also find significant non-linearities, i.e., the quadratic term in q is negative and significant. In particular, both identity and homogamy appear to be negatively related to ethnic composition for values of q greater than 20%. Figure 3a confirms this result by depicting the estimated (non-linear) relationship between ethnic identity and ethnic neighborhood composition q, 17 The words segregation/segregated should be carefully interpreted here and in the rest of the paper: we refer to more segregated neighborhoods to mean neighborhoods with a higher proportion of the population of the same ethnicity. As we noted, highly segregated wards are not observed in the sample. 18 In the probit estimations, we measure q as the fraction of own ethnic group in the neighborhood. The fraction of all minority residents in the neighborhood has been, however, included among the controls.
once the influence of our most extensive set of controls has been purged out. 19 These non-linearities suggest that ethnic identity is weaker in relatively more segregated neighborhoods, a result more consistent with cultural distinction than with cultural conformity. The non-linearities picked up by the probit models might, in principle, be due to the differential distribution of ethnic groups by neighborhood class. 20 This is not the case, in fact, since the same form of non-linear dependence in q is obtained when the sample is restricted to Muslims only (mostly Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Indians), as documented in Figure 3b .
[Insert F igure 3a and 3b here]
The analysis in this section is essentially descriptive and more structure is necessary to strengthen our confidence in interpreting the results of this section as evidence for cultural distinction.
Conformity vs. distinction: Some structure
In this section we add some structure which turns out to be useful to interpret the relationship between identity, homogamy, and ethnic composition. As we noted in the Introduction, cultural distinction and conformity are element of individuals' preferences and hence act on the "demand" of homogamy in marriage. But the distribution of marriages along the homogamy/heterogamy dimension is an equilibrium outcome. A simple matching model of marriage however allows us to identify "demand" and "supply" effects, leading us closer to the identification of cultural distinction and conformity.
Consider homogamy as the result of effort in finding a spouse of the same ethnic background. Let this effort be a continuous variable denoted by τ ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that the minority member first searches a spouse in a restricted pool of partners from his/her own community minority. The search intensity, τ , determines the probability with which he/she finds his/her marital partner in the pool. With the residual probability 1 − τ , he/she remains unsuccessful and therefore goes to a common pool of partners that includes both minority and majority types. There, he/she gets matched with a spouse of his/her community with probability q. As a result, an ethnic minority individual living in a neighborhood with a fraction q of minority members has a probability of marrying homogamously equals to
leads to similar results. We have also performed our analysis using a a multidimensional measure of ethnic identity, which summarizes the information contained in the available indicators. We have followed the standard approach in the sociological literature to derive quantitative information on sensitive topics using qualitative answers to a battery of related questions. This is a standard factor analysis, where the factor loadings of the different variables (questions) are used to derive the total score (multidimensional measure). The Crombach-α measure is then used to assess the quality of the derived index. In our case, we obtain an α equal to 0.86 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) indicating that the different items incorporated in the index have considerable internal consistency. We find that even this aggregate measure does not depend (qualitatively) differently on q. 20 We thank Bill Easterly for raising this point in a critical discussion of the paper.
Imposing this simple (linear) homogamy model on the data, we can estimate τ and evaluate its fit. Deviations from linearity could tell us a great deal about the underline abstract model of homogamy (and hence of ethnic identity). Indeed a linear relationship between π and q does not fit the data well. For instance, with τ .75 we fit homogamy π at q 0 but we grossly underestimate homogamy at higher q's: for instance, for q = 40% we get π .85 while it is > .95 in the data for q ≥ 33%. A flexible functional form for the relationship between π and q suggests in turn a concave relationship between τ and q. Indeed, the best model produces (a map τ which is quadratic in q and hence) an implied negative relationship between τ and q for q large enough (larger than 25% in the estimate). This can be interpreted as a suggestion for cultural distinction, but it might be worth to model directly the individuals' marriage choice, their choice of τ , to draw tighter implications about how the relationship between τ and q depends on cultural distinction vs. conformity.
Marriage choice and identity: Model
Consider a member of an ethnic or religious group. 21 As in the previous section, let q denote the proportion of ethnic minorities in the neighborhood where this ethnic person resides. Let homogamy be an index H ∈ {0, 1}, with Pr{H = 1} = π (i.e. H = 1 means that the ethnic minority is married to someone from the same ethnic group while H = 0 indicates heterogamy). There is a psychological cost of interacting with individuals from the majority (dominant) group. We assume that this (psychological) cost depends on the marriage status of the minority member and is denoted by C(H). We further assume that such costs are lower in an homogamous than in an heterogamous marriage, i.e.
Indeed, all ethnic minorities need to interact with natives, for example when their kids go to the same school and have the same social activities, or when they need to find a job. The unit cost of interacting with natives is the same for all ethnic minorities. However, we postulate that, when a minority individual gets married with someone from the same ethnic group, he/she does not need to socially interact as much with natives (he/she puts children in an "ethnic" school, works with people from the same ethnic group, etc.). As a result, the total cost of socially interacting with natives is lower for an individual in an homogamous marriage than for someone who is married to a native (heterogamy) since the latter spends more time with natives (he/she needs to meet the parents in law, to put his/her kids in the majority school, etc.). In our framework, C denotes the total cost of interacting with a native and it satisfies (2) , that is C(0) > C(1).
In general, ∆C is also a function of q as well as of the strength of identity of the ethnic minority; we denote this strength of identity by an index I ∈ {0, 1} with Pr{I = 1} = ν. 22 Indeed, the composition of the neighborhood as well as the strength of identity have an obvious impact on this cost differential since families living in more "ethnic" neighborhoods and with stronger ethnic identities are more 21 We only consider here two groups: the ethnic minority and the majority groups. Our theoretical analysis can easily be extended to more than one ethnic group. 22 C is therefore also a function of both q and I.
ensured that their ethnic identity will be passed on to their kids. We thus have ∆C = ∆C(q, I). 23 It is then straightforward to formulate a precise definition of cultural conformity and distinction:
The preferences of an ethnic minority individual display cultural conformity if the differential cost ∆C decreases with the proportion of non-minority members 1 − q, i.e.
∂∆C(q,I) ∂q
cultural distinction if the differential cost ∆C increases with the proportion of non-minority members 1 − q, i.e.
∂∆C(q,I) ∂q < 0.
In the cultural conformity assumption, the minority's psychological costs of interacting with individuals from the majority group are decreasing in the proportion of whites living in the neighborhood where the minority resides. In the cultural distinction assumption, we have the opposite. 24 To be more precise, when minorities are more exposed to the majority group (i.e., when 1 − q increases), the difference in interaction costs with whites between an homogamous and heterogamous minority person is reduced with cultural conformity. Indeed, in that case, minorities tend to assimilate to the majority norm and their marital status have less impact on interaction costs. However, when we consider cultural distinction, this cost differential tends to increase because minorities are now rejecting the "white" norm and homogamous minorities interact much less with the majority group.
Minority members put effort in finding a spouse of the same ethnic background. Let this effort be a continuous variable denoted by τ ∈ [0, 1]. The minority member first searches a spouse in a restricted pool of partners from his/her own community minority. The search intensity, τ , determines the probability with which he/she finds his/her marital partner in the pool. With the residual probability 1 − τ , he/she remains unsuccessful and therefore goes to a common pool of partners that includes both minority and majority types. There, he/she gets matched with a spouse of his/her community with probability q. As a result, an ethnic minority individual living in a neighborhood with a fraction q of minority members has a probability of marrying homogamously equals to
The search intensity τ is chosen by the agent but it requires a cost Z(τ ), in the same units of the psychological costs C(.). For analytical simplicity, we assume that:
A minority member's problem is thus: 25
23 Remember that in this section both q and I are exogenous. We will relax these assumptions below. 24 See our discussion in the Introduction. 25 For notational simplicity, we don't put q and I as arguments of the cost function C(.) .
where α is a measure of the relative cost of τ . As a result, the first order condition of problem (5) lead to:
The probability of an homogamous marriage is thus equal to
Observe that if there is cultural distinction, then ∂τ * /∂q < 0, i.e., the higher is the proportion of the same ethnic group living in the neighborhood, the lower is the homogamy effort while the opposite sign is true (∂τ * /∂q > 0) with cultural conformity if the elasticity of q with respect to ∆C is large enough. However, the sign of ∂π * /∂q tends to be ambiguous with either cultural distinction or cultural conformity. This is what we want to investigate empirically now.
Marriage choice and identity: Empirical implementation
Based on this simple model, we would like to test equation (7), i.e. the relationship between π (homogamy) and q (neighborhood ethnic composition). To be able to empirically implement the model, we introduce x, a vector of exogenous variables (like e.g. age, education, etc.), which affects both q (neighborhood composition) and ν (identity strength), and the cost Z(τ ). The relationship between (q, ν) and x can be abstractly represented by an equilibrium map of the form q ν = F (x), which will depend on deep parameters that determine ∆C(q, I). Concerning the cost Z(τ ) defined in (4), we assume that:
where γ τ x = K j=1 γ τ j x j . Rewriting the first-order condition (7) with this extension in terms of x leads to:
The empirical implementation of this equation requires therefore fitting
with appropriate approximating polynomials. 26 To test whether the sign of
is negative (i.e. cultural distinction) or positive (i.e. cultural conformity) it is sufficient to estimate (8), approximating ∆C(q, ν) as follows via a second order polynomial:
The model implies cross-equation restrictions between
and q ν = F (x). By approximating ∆C(q, I) via polynomials, we are implicitly disregarding these restrictions.
Marriage choice and identity: Results
Results of the empirical analysis are reported in Figures 4a and 4b (for the whole sample and the Muslim sample only, respectively). For both samples, the partial derivative of the interaction costs with respect to q is always negative, ∂∆C(q, I) ∂q < 0, for both I = 0 and I = 1.
This result is clearly evidence in favor of the cultural distinction mechanism: integration, as manifested by a relatively high q, leads to significant difference in interaction costs between homogamous and heterogamous individuals. 27 [Insert F igures 4a and 4b here]
Conformity vs. distinction: Structural models
The empirical analysis in the previous sections of the paper is predicated under the assumption that the ethnic distribution by neighborhood (ward) as well as ethnic identity are exogenous. We have no ex-ante reason to believe this assumption. Therefore we now complement the analysis of the previous section by structurally studying ethnic integration via marriage, location, and identity formation. As a consequence, under the assumption of the structural model, we can evaluate the relative likelihood of the data with respect to cultural distinction vs. cultural conformity, the dichotomous characteristic of the preferences of the individual subjects we assume is generating the data. Formally, this requires developing a model for ∆C(q, I) so that q and I are chosen and are not exogenously given (as in the previous section). In fact, in the interest of simplicity, we will study two distinct models, one in which location is exogenous and one in which identity is exogenous. To be more precise, we develop two different, extreme (semi-nested) models:
Identity formation (with exogenous ethnic composition of the location, q): people are dropped in a neighborhood and then form their ethnic identity (choose ν) and look for a spouse (choose τ ).
Location choice (with exogenous identity I): people are born with an identity and then look for a neighborhood where to reside (choose q) and a spouse (choose τ ).
We will show that the location choice model does not explain the data well. It is not the case, in particular, that individuals with stronger ethnic identity reside in more segregated wards, other things equal. This is not the case even after linking homogamy and identity as in the model. While this is 27 The identity formation process of the members of a minority group depends on the cultural characteristics of the minority itself (e.g., his/her cultural distance to the majority), but also on the actions and predispositions of the majority (e.g., their racial attitudes). We do not have accurate data to be able to distinguish between these determinants of identity, even though x contains some controls of some relevance, e.g., a measure of the episodes of ethnic/religious harassment each respondent has been subject to.
not statistical evidence that q is exogenous, it nonetheless suggest that a test of cultural distinction vs. conformity can be performed efficiently in the context of our first model of marriage and identity. We shall proceed along these lines. 28 
Identity formation model
As in Section 3.1, we define the psychological cost of interacting with individuals from the majority group by C (H, I, q) . In other words, this cost for an ethnic minority depends on his/her marriage status H (= 1 if homogamous and 0 otherwise), his/her identity status I (= 1 if having a strong identity and 0 otherwise) and q, the percentage ethnic minorities where he/she resides. We have (H, I) ∈ {0, 1} 2 and q ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that the probability ν = Pr{I = 1} is here modeled as a choice of the individual. In terms of notation, we use ν ∈ [0, 1] rather than I. We assume that identity and homogamy act as complements to each other so that either ν = Pr{I = 1} and H = 1 or 1 − ν = Pr{I = 0} and H = 0. In other words, individuals with strong identity are necessary married to someone from the same ethnic group (H = 1) while people with weak identity are necessary married to whites (H = 0). For simplicity, we use the following explicit function:
which implies that either C(1, ν, q) = (1 − ν)C(q) or C(0, ν, q) = C(q). This means that a strong identity (ν) with an homogamous marriage (H = 1) leads to a lower cost of interacting with whites than a weak identity with an heterogamous marriage. Our explanation is as before. Individuals married to someone from the same ethnic group and having a strong identity do not interact very much with whites and thus have a lower interacting cost than someone more "integrated" to the majority group. This specification implies that
In this section, we assume that location q is exogenous and individuals choose their identity and homogamy efforts, ν and τ . The utility cost of developing identity ν is denoted by J(ν), in the same units of the psychological costs C(q). As a result, a minority member's problem is:
Assuming for simplicity that J(ν) is quadratic, i.e. J(ν) = 1 2 ν 2 , the first order conditions of this problem can easily be reduced to:
This is a simultaneous equation system in which (ν, π) are the endogenous variables and q the exogenous variable; see the Appendix for the solution in closed form.
Location choice model
In this section, we still assume (9) . The choice of identity ν is now exogenous while location q is chosen. The cost of living in a neighborhood with a percentage q of ethnic minorities is denoted by G(q), in the same units of the psychological costs C(q). 29 The minority member's problem can now be written as:
Assuming for simplicity that G(q) is quadratic, i.e. G(q) = 1 2 q 2 , the first order conditions of this problem are given by:
This is a simultaneous equation system in which (q, π) are the endogenous variables and ν the exogenous variable; see the Appendix for the rather involved closed form solution.
A nested representation of conformity and distinction
Under cultural conformity, the minority's psychological costs of interacting with individuals from the majority group are decreasing in the proportion 1 − q of the majority residing in the neighborhood where the minority lives. The simplest formulation therefore has:
Under cultural distinction, the minority's psychological costs to interact with individuals from the majority group are increasing in the proportion 1 − q of the majority in the neighborhood where the minority resides. The simplest formulation thus has:
Given (9), this implies that ∆C(q, ν) = ν c q and thus ∂∆C(q, ν)/∂q > 0 for cultural conformity, and ∆C(q, ν) = ν c (1 − q) and thus ∂∆C(q, ν)/∂q < 0 for cultural distinction. This is exactly the definitions we gave in Section 4. We can then plug the value of C(q), given by either (14) or (15), into the identity formation model (Section 4.1) and the location choice model (Section 4.2). To distinguish between cultural conformity and cultural distinction, we can nest the reduced form equations as follows:
C(q) = cψ(q), with ψ(q) = γ 1 − γ 2 q 29 We assume that, other things equal, neighborhoods with higher q are less preferable (because, for example, of higher unemployment, less average income, etc.). We do not need to make this assumption. We could estimate the sign of the dependence of costs from q. But all agents would live in segregated neighborhoods under the assumptions of our model if they were cheaper to reside in. 14 so that when γ 1 = γ 2 = 1 there is cultural distinction when γ 1 = 0 and γ 2 = −1 there is cultural conformity (16) Empirically, to discriminate between cultural conformity and distinction, it is sufficient to verify whether γ 2 is greater or smaller than zero.
Empirical implementation
Both the identity formation and the location choice models are identified exploiting the non-linearities induced by the choice problems and the functional form assumptions we impose. As in Section 3.1, for the empirical implementation of costs, we have to add the vector of individuals' characteristics x to obtain:
where x j (j = τ, ν, q) are the exogenous determinants of the cost and regressors in the empirical implementation, and γ τ x τ , γ ν x ν , γ q x q represent the vector notation:
γ νj x j , and γ q x q = N j=1 γ qj x j . By using these cost formulations and solving each program, we can extend equations (10) and (11) and obtain a simultaneous equation system in ν and π for identity formation model. Likewise, for the location choice model, we extend equations (12) and (13) and obtain a simultaneous equation system in q and π. The Appendix provides the details on the systems of equations we put to data (equations (25)- (26) and equations (27) - (28)) as well as simple informal argument for the identification of parameters γ 1 , γ 2 , c, α, γ ν , γ τ for the identity formation model and γ 1 , γ 2 , c, α, γ q , γ τ for location choice model.
Writing a likelihood function and searching for the structural parameters (γ 1 , γ 2 , c, α, γ ν , γ τ ) for the identity formation model 30 is straightforward. Because there are no a priori arguments to select the variables to be included as determinants of the costs of identity and homogamy, we consider
We observe n (independent) bivariate Bernoulli trials with a pair of characteristics being studied at each trial. The probabilities of the outcomes vary over the trials. We have:
Once the joint determination of I and H is explicitly accounted for by the forms of the probabilities ν and π, the two random variables may be assumed to be independent. Hence
30 One can also write in a similar way the likelihood function for the location choice model and search for the structural parameters (γ1, γ2, c, α, γq, γτ ).
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The likelihood function can then be written as:
The maximization of the likelihood function (17) under the two (alternative) models (16) will then uncover which one of the two models of integration formation better fits our data. 31 
Results
The maximum likelihood estimation results of the identity formation and the location choice models are reported in the first two columns of Table 3 , using the most extensive set of controls. 32 The last two columns report the results of our analysis when restricting the attention to Muslims only, which we will discuss in Section 5. Following Burnham and Anderson (2002), we adopt the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as a test between non-nested models for model selection. Different competing models can be ranked according to their AIC, with the one having the lowest AIC being the best. In the general case, AIC = 2k − 2 ln(L) where k is the number of parameters in the statistical model, and L is the value of the maximized likelihood function. In our simple context (in which k does not vary between models), the AIC reduces to a likelihood comparison: the preferred model is the one with the highest maximized likelihood (i.e. lowest AIC). The maximized likelihoods are reported in the last row of Table 3 . The evidence overwhelmingly favors the identity formation model over the location choice model. Indeed, the identity formation model shows a maximized likelihood value that is much higher than the one of the location choice model (-1288.972 and -1369.067 respectively). It is thus apparent that the identity formation model (with exogenous location) performs best. 33 
[Insert T able 3 here]
Let us now focus our attention on the parameter estimates. As noted before, the effects of the exogenous regressors are not additively separable from the effect of q. Our test of the cultural distinction against the cultural conformity mechanism is based on the estimate of γ 2 . As stated in (16), a positive estimate of γ 2 would be in line with cultural distinction, whereas a negative estimate would support cultural conformity. Table 3 shows that such an estimate is clearly positive, which indicates that a cultural distinction mechanism of identity formation is consistent with our data. 34 31 The estimation has been performed using R programming language (www.r-project.org). 32 The estimation has also been performed under different (increasing) sets of controls (as in Table 1 ). The results on our target parameters remain qualitatively unchanged. 33 For only one of the two solutions of the location choice model the estimation converges. 34 A more rigorous statistical comparison which would imply to compare the unconstrained with the constrained likelihood under the two sets of constraints γ2 > 0 and γ2 < 0 is problematic in these cases because the distribution of the resulting likelihood ratio tests with inequality constraints are non-standard (see Chernoff, 1954; Wilks, 1938; Self and Liang, 1987 ; Shaw and Geyer, 1997).
Interpretation
To develop a better intuition about which aspect of the data drives this result, we study the identity formation model (i.e., the better performing model) in more detail. Under cultural distinction, the first order conditions of the model are given by: 35
Various simple conclusions can be obtained from these equations. Consider first condition (18), expressing how identity formation ν depends on the proportion q of minority members and on π the probability of homogamy. Clearly, the larger is the proportion of minority members and the more segregated the neighborhood is, the lower is C(q) = c (1 − q), the psychological cost of interacting with the majority group, and the smaller are the incentives for identity formation as a cultural distinction. On the other hand, the higher is the probability π of homogamous marriage resulting from socialization effort, the larger are the expected benefits from identity formation and the more intense is the identity.
Interestingly, marital segregation, as reflected by π, and neighborhood segregation, as reflected by q, are substitutes in terms of identity formation. In other words, the marginal effect of marital segregation on identity formation tends to be reduced the more segregated the neighborhood is (i.e., the larger is q).
Consider now equation (19) characterizing the (endogenous) probability of homogamy as a function of identity ν and neighborhood segregation q. The more intense is the identity formation, the higher is the probability of homogamy. On the other hand, the effect of q on π is ambiguous and reflects two opposite effects. First, there is a direct effect related to the fact that the larger the proportion of minority people in the neighborhood, the larger the probability of finding a minority spouse in the common pool of potential partners. This effect is reflected in the first term q of (19) . The second effect is illustrated by the second term (1 − q) 2 C(q)ν and indicates the impact of a change in q on the marginal incentives to marital segregation (i.e., the socialization effort τ ). Indeed, the more segregated is the neighborhood (i.e., the larger is q), the smaller are the incentives to spend resources of finding directly a partner in the restricted pool of minority spouses. First, because social interactions with the majority people are less costly, there is less of a need for identity formation that can be effectively expressed in an homogamous marriage. This is reflected by the term C(q). Second, a larger proportion of minority people in the neighborhood also reduces the incentives to make special effort to find a spouse in a segregated marital pool, as minority people are already more likely to be found in the common marital pool. Both channels reduce therefore the incentives for socialization efforts τ , which, in turn, tends to reduce the probability of homogamy π. It is also interesting to observe that, for the choice of socialization effort and probability of homogamy, identity and neighborhood segregation (as reflected by q) are substitutes. More precisely, the marginal effect of identity on minority homogamy tends to be reduced the more segregated the neighborhood (i.e., the larger is q).
Under cultural conformity, instead, the first order conditions of the model are given by:
Again, simple conclusions can be drawn from these equations. Consider first (20) . In that case, the larger the proportion q of minority members and the more segregated the neighborhood, the higher C(q). Similarly, the larger the probability π of homogamous marriage, the larger the expected benefits from identity, and hence the more intense is identity formation. Again the sign of the cross derivative is interesting. Marital segregation (as reflected by π) and neighborhood segregation (as reflected by q), under cultural conformity, are complements in terms of identity formation. In other words, the marginal effect of marital segregation on identity formation is larger, the more segregated the neighborhood is (i.e., the larger is q).
Consider now equation (21) . The more intense is identity formation, the larger is the probability of homogamy. The effect of q on π is also ambiguous and reflects now three effects. First, there is as before the direct effect related to the fact that the larger the proportion of minority people in the neighborhood, the larger the probability of finding a minority spouse in the common pool of potential partners. This effect is illustrated by the first term q in (21) . A second positive effect is illustrated by νC(q) in the second term (1 − q) 2 νC(q). The larger q, the larger the conformity psychological gain of social interactions with other minority individuals in the neighborhood and the associated identity formation process that can be effectively expressed in homogamous marriages. This increases the incentives for homogamous marriages and the marginal incentives to marital segmentation (i.e., the socialization effort τ ). The last effect of q on π is negative. As in the case of cultural distinction, it reflects simply the fact that a larger q reduces the incentives to make special efforts to find a spouse in a segregated marital pool., as minority people are already likely to be found in the common marital pool. This channel, captured by the expression (1 − q) 2 in the second term (1 − q) 2 νC(q) of equation (21), decreases the incentives for socialization efforts τ , and tends to reduce the probability of homogamy π. Finally, identity and neighborhood segregation (as reflected by q) interact in terms of the formation of homogamous minority marriages. The second cross derivative of π with respect to ν and q has the sign of
which is, in general, ambiguous. When C(0) = 0, namely when identity formation gains are very small for small minority populations, it is easy to see that
for small enough values of q. In that case, neighborhood segregation and identity are complements for homogamy. From the first order conditions of the cultural distinction and the cultural conformity models, it clearly appears that the distinctive characteristics of the cultural distinction model are:
1. ν is decreasing in q, for q large; and 2.
The reader might want to conclude that these are the characteristics of cultural distinction we are identifying in the data.
Simulations
We now perform a series of simulations, using the estimates of our best model, the identity formation model, to predict ethnic integration. We study the latter by looking at the relationship between the identity or the homogamy status of an ethnic minority and his or her time spent in the UK. We will also look at the role played by the neighborhood ethnic composition where this individual lives in shaping such a process. We distinguish between first and second generations of immigrants. 36 Our analysis so far suggests that ethnic identities might be more intense in mixed rather than in segregated neighborhoods. The additional questions that we seek to investigate regard the implications of our structural estimates: (i) Do they imply that ethnic identity and homogamy decrease with the time a person spends in the UK? And, is such a tendency more marked for second generation immigrants? (ii) Do they imply that minorities living in more integrated (mixed) neighborhoods show a steeper decreasing trend in the ethnic variables than those living in segregated neighborhoods? And, is there any difference in the implied assimilation pattern between first and second generation of immigrants for a given neighborhood ethnic composition? We address such questions while controlling for a variety of other individual and contextual characteristics, i.e., our simulations are run on the model that includes our extensive set of controls.
We begin by showing the integration patterns of ethnic minorities over time. Figures 5a and 5b show the predicted identity and homogamy values as a function of time spent in the UK for different generations. We can see that there is a tendency toward ethnic integration, which is particularly pronounced for the second generation, in particular for identity.
[Insert F igures 5a and 5b here]
We then simulate those patterns when setting neighborhood composition equals to the sample minimum, average and maximum levels. The results are reported in Figures 6a and 6b , for identity and homogamy variables, respectively. Interestingly, the pictures remains largely unchanged for the different neighborhood ethnic compositions. It only appears a less steep decreasing trend of homogamy in more segregated neighborhoods.
[Insert F igures 6a and 6b here] 36 "Time spent in the UK" is measured as "years since arrival"" for first generation immigrants and as "age" for second generation immigrants. Second generation immigrants are defined as ethnic minority individuals who are born in the UK.
Such findings thus show evidence of an integration patterns of immigrants, which is particularly marked for second generation individuals and when ethnic identity is the ethnic dimension considered. The residential neighborhood ethnic composition, however, does not seem to play a crucial role in shaping such a pattern, neither for the first nor for the second generation of immigrants. Therefore, our analysis seems to suggest not only that ethnic identities might be more intense in mixed rather than in segregated neighborhoods, but also that living in more mixed neighborhoods does not ease the integration pattern.
Is Muslim identity different?
A large debate has recently emerged in the popular press about the alleged specificity of Muslim immigrants with regard to the strength of their identity and their (lack of) assimilation tendencies. 37 Several of the ethnic groups for which we have data have in fact a significant Muslim population; notably Pakistani and Bangladeshi are predominantly Muslim, while Indians and African-Asian have substantial Muslim minorities. Furthermore, the FNSEM survey contains a direct question asking the respondent to identify his or her religious faith. In this section, we exploit therefore our data to address directly the alleged Muslim specificity issue.
To this end, we repeat our analysis on the restricted sample of Muslim respondents (713 individuals, roughly 45 percent of the whole sample). We maintain, however, the distribution by ethnic group as the relevant neighborhood composition variable in the identity formation and socialization processes. Descriptive statistics of our variables on this sub-sample can be found in the Data Appendix (Table  A1) .
Our maximum likelihood results are contained in the last two columns of Table 3 . They are not qualitatively different from those in the first two columns, which are obtained on the whole sample and discussed in the previous section. The endogenous identity with cultural distinction model remains the mechanism that is more likely to represent the observed evidence. Indeed, a comparison between the maximized likelihood values between the endogenous identity and the endogenous location model clearly favors again the former one (-402.489 versus -446.066, respectively). The positive (and statistically significant) estimate of γ 2 points to the fact that cultural distinction is the mechanism that seems to fit better our data. Such a finding indicates that the relationship between ethnic assimilation effort and ethnic neighborhood composition is not different for Muslims than for other minorities. In other words, we still find evidence in line with the possibility that ethnic identity and socialization effort are more intense in mixed rather than in segregated neighborhoods when only the Muslim subsample is considered.
As for the whole sample, we now perform some simulations on the Muslims sub-sample of our best 37 This position has been taken, in a rather extreme form, by several nationalist parties, e.g., the British National Party in England, the Lega in Italy, the Front National in France, Sverige Demokraterna in Sweden. Similar though less extreme positions have also been taken by center-right parties essentially all over Europe. A clear example of the inflamed rhetoric that often accompanies this debate is Fallaci (2006) . See also the discussion in Sheikh (2005) model, the endogenous identity model, to predict ethnic integration, that is, identity and homogamy as a function of "time spent in the UK", and the role played by the neighborhood ethnic composition in shaping such a process. The results are reported in Figures 7a and 7b , and 8a and 8b. Evidence of slower integration for Muslims is apparent from these figures, in particular for ethnic identity. More interestingly, although the second generation shows levels of identity and homogamy always lower than the first generation, we find for second generation Muslims a tendency to increase rather than decrease the strength of their ethnic identity and homogamy over time. The almost non-existent role of neighborhood ethnic composition in shaping these patterns remain confirmed in this sub-sample of Muslims.
[Insert F igures 7a, 7b, 8a, and 8b here]
7 Discussion and policy implications
In this paper, we find that: (i ) in more segregated neighborhoods, ethnic identity is stronger than in less segregated neighborhoods, suggesting cultural distinction among ethnic minorities in England;
(ii ) there is a tendency toward ethnic integration, which is particularly pronounced for the second generation, in particular for ethnic identity; (iii ) there are no significant differences in the integration patterns in neighborhoods with different ethnic compositions. Although Muslims, and in particular the second generation, seem to be more reluctant to integrate, our findings (i ) and (iii ) remain unchanged.
In light of these results, our analysis suggests that integration policies favoring the formation of less segregated neighborhoods, fearing the effects of geographical segregation, are possibly minimally effective if not counterproductive. In this respect, our results could explain why the different integration policies implemented in the U.S. and in Europe seem to have small effects because of the possible perverse effects of integration policies which might trigger more intense ethnic identities. Indeed, mixing policies, which include school busing, affirmative action in public schools and in the workplace, forced integration of public housing, and laws barring discrimination in housing and employment, 38 have often had limited effects and are even being at times opposed by the same minority groups in whose interest they have been pursued (see e.g., Jacoby, 1998, and Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 2002) , consistently with the view that identity formation mechanisms are driven by cultural distinction, James Coleman, for instance, fifteen years after the Coleman Report in 1966, which originally proposed busing, admitted that, "the assumption that busing would improve achievement of lower-class black children has now been shown to be fiction" (cited in Jacoby, 1999) . 39 Moving to Opportunity (MTO) programs in the United States that relocate families from high-to low-poverty neighborhoods (and from racially segregated to mixed neighborhoods) also have had positive but arguably small effects (see, in particular, Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield, 2001, and Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005) . 40 Similarly, the Toronto housing program where adults were assigned as children to different residential housing projects (Oreopoulos, 2003) did not give the expected results in terms of education outcomes. In Europe different integration policies and ambitious social programs have been implemented in urban areas where immigrants live but they have had also limited results. This is the case, for instance, for the creations of Zones of Educational Priority (ZEP) and for the rehabilitation of bleak housing projects in immigrant neighborhoods under the guise of urban policy ('politique de la ville') in France. 41 Finally, even racially integrated schools have recently lost much of their appeal in African-American communities (see e.g., the ethnographic study of Gussin Paley, 1995) .
Far from supporting policies to establish segregated neighborhoods, in this paper, we simply document that the effect of integrated neighborhood on identity formation and socialization might be perverse, because of cultural distinction. 40 There are, of course, other complementary mechanisms that could explain why the MTO programs had small effects.
It is indeed possible that it is the loss of social networks that makes this policy relatively inefficient. A recent book (De Souza Briggs et al., 2010) evaluating the MTO programs shows that poor black families who move to richer areas tend to mostly interact with their old friends (i.e. their old social networks) from their old "bad" neighborhoods. Based on interviews and case studies, the authors claim that this may explain the relative small effects of this policy. Another explanation for the relative failure of MTO programs given by Quigley and Raphael (2008) is that families move from very poor to poor neighborhoods and thus the interactions in the new neighborhood is not that beneficial. Using data on adolescents in the US (AddHealth data), Weinberg (2010) show that individuals associate with people whose behaviors and characteristics are similar to their own and this tendency is stronger in large groups. This suggests that the MTO types of policies can have small effects because the people who move to richer areas only interact with similar types of people and not necessary with those who could generate positive externalities. 
where k ν and k π are the estimated coefficients of x in the equations (25) and (26) for ν and π, respectively, for a given q. It is easy to check that one such solution exists.
The marriage and location model
The ethnic minority minimizes his/her expected cost of interacting with whites, that is:
The first order conditions of this individual's problem are:
which, using τ = π−q 1−q (from (3)), are equivalent to:
Writing this system of equations in terms of ν and q leads to:
and π is implicitly determined by the following equation
where
As a result,
To identify γ 1 , γ 2 , c, α, γ q and γ τ , we can again use the same informal argument as we did above Notes: High ethnic identity residents are defined as those who strongly agree with the statement "people of Black-Caribbean and Asian origin should try to preserve as much as possible of their culture and way of life". 
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